This pressure, which can be bilateral (for example. B under U.S. Trade Representative Special Procedure 301) or multilateral (smaller competing trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), has multiplied in recent years due to an effective failure of the WTO negotiations, which halted further progress in their last round of negotiations, the Doha Development Round. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the international organization that deals with trade rules between nations. Since February 2005, 148 countries have been members of the WTO. Countries are committed to complying with the 18 specific agreements attached to the WTO agreement. They cannot choose to be proponents of certain agreements, but not others (with the exception of some “multilateral” agreements that are not mandatory). The Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is an agreement of international law between all World Trade Organization (WTO) member states. It sets minimum standards for the regulation of different forms of intellectual property by national governments, as is the case for nationals of other WTO member states.  The TRIPS agreement was negotiated at the end of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) between 1989 and 1990 and is managed by the WTO. Trips-plus conditions, which impose standards beyond TRIPS, have also been verified.
 These free trade agreements contain conditions that limit the ability of governments to introduce competition for generic drug manufacturers. In particular, the United States has been criticized for promoting protection far beyond the standards prescribed by the TRIPS. The U.S. free trade agreements with Australia, Morocco and Bahrain have expanded patentability by making patents available for new uses of known products.  The TRIPS agreement authorizes the granting of compulsory licences at the discretion of a country. The terms of trips plus in the U.S. Free Trade Agreement with Australia, Jordan, Singapore and Vietnam have limited the application of mandatory licences to emergencies, remedies for cartels and abuse of dominance, and cases of non-commercial public use.  The duration of protection is at least 50 years for performers and producers of phonograms and 20 years for broadcasters (Article 14.5). Daniele Archibugi and Andrea Filippetti argue that the importance of TRIPS in the process of developing and disseminating knowledge and innovation has been overestimated by its supporters. This was supported by the FINDINGs of the United Nations that many low-protection countries regularly benefit from significant foreign direct investment (FDI).  Analysis of OECD countries in the 1980s and 1990s (which extended the lifespan of drug patents by 6 years) showed that, although the total number of registered products increased slightly, the average innovation index remained unchanged.
 On the other hand, J-rg Baten, Nicola Bianchi and Petra Moser (2017) find historical evidence that compulsory licensing – a key mechanism for weakening IP rights under Article 31 of TRIPS – can effectively lead to the promotion of inventions by increasing the threat to competition in areas of low competition. They argue, however, that the benefits of weakening intellectual property rights depend heavily on the ability of governments to make a credible commitment to use them only in exceptional cases, since companies can invest less in research and development if they expect repeated episodes of mandatory licensing.